Appendix: Supporting Information for *Sorting for K Street*

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A Further Background on HLOGA

The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 enacted, for the first time, statutory post-employment regulations for certain legislative branch officials. These limitations were codified at section 207 of the Federal Criminal Code (Title 18) and went into effect with the swearing of the 102nd Congress in January 1991. The cooling-off period specified that for one year after leaving office, a covered former legislative employee may not "knowingly [make], with the intent to influence, any communication to or appearance before [the specific Member/committee/office for whom that former staffer was an employee] on behalf of any other person (except the United States) in connection with any matter" on which the former officeholder seeks official action (Select Committee on Ethics, 2003). Even before HLOGA, the law applied only to Members of Congress, officers, and employees who earn at a rate of pay at least 75% of a Member's annual salary.

Yet, HLOGA strengthened these rules and their enforcement in multiple ways. First, §101 of HLOGA amended §207 of US Code 18 such that all elected officers and staff of the Senate are now prohibited from contacting *any* Senator or *any* officer or employee of the Senate with the intent to influence and seek action by the Senate. Second, §103 of HLOGA prescribes that the Clerk of the House, after consultation with the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, or the Secretary of the Senate, need to notify covered officials of the beginning and ending date of the prohibitions that apply under §207(e) of US Code 18. As

a result, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate now disclose all covered officials together with the exact dates of coverage on their public website. Third, §301 and §532 of HLOGA amends the Rules of the House and the Standing Rules of the Senate, respectively, and determines that covered employees of either chamber need to notify the relevant Ethics Committee that they are negotiating or have an agreement of future employment of compensation. By strengthening the disclosure requirements for covered officials as well as their awareness of the regulations and penalties, these additional regulations significantly improved the enforceability of post-employment restrictions in Congress. It is important to note that covered employees are limited in their contacts regardless of whether they become, or are employed by, *registered* lobbyists.

Following HLOGA, the statute stipulates that a covered former employee may not, for a period of one year after leaving Congress:

- Knowingly communicate with or appear before the employee's former employing office or committee – or for Senate employees any Senator or any officer or employee of the Senate – with the intent to influence, on behalf of any other person, the official actions or decisions by a Member, officer, or employee in such office or committee (§207(e)(3)-(7)).
- Knowingly represent a foreign government or foreign political party before any federal official (including any Member of Congress) with the intent to influence a decision of such official in official duties (§§207(f)(1)(A) and (i)(1)(B)).
- Knowingly aid or advise a foreign government or foreign political party with the intent to influence a decision of any federal official (including Members of Congress) in carrying out their official duties (§207(f)(1)(B)).

Besides the official notification of coverage at the time of leaving Congress, staffers receive information about the relevant restrictions and penalties through various means. First, all new Members, officers and employees of both House and Senate need to receive a compulsory ethics training within 60 days of their start date in Congress.[1] Additionally, following HLOGA both the Senate Select Committee on Ethics and House Committee on Ethics published multiple memoranda that detailed the exact regulations together with the coverage rules and exceptions.[2]

B Summary of Interviews with Staffers

To clarify the process of wage setting and strategic wage manipulation of staffers in Congress, I conducted three semi-structured interviews with mid-level to senior staff in Congress. All interviews were on background and not for attribution. The interviews were conducted with

[1] https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ethics-faqs; https://ethics.house.gov/legislation/schedule/faqs-about-training

[2] e.g. see https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/bf9ea0f9-2593-4f49-83b3-f581f86b9098/guidance-on-the-post-employment-contact-ban.pdf; https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/Members%20and%20Officers.pdf

a current mid-level committee staffer (henceforth staffer 1), a former leadership office staffer (henceforth staffer 2) and a former senior personal and committee staffer (henceforth staffer 3). From their specific positions in Congress, staffers 1 and 2 have extensive experience and knowledge relevant to wage setting and ethics rules in Congress. As a senior staff member, staffer 3 had valuable information about the career incentives and strategies of staff affected by HLOGA. All staffers were asked the same questions (not necessarily verbatim) about wage setting processes in Congress, the influence of staffers in negotiating salaries and their ability to achieve certain salary figures, their awareness of HLOGA's restrictions, qualitative evidence on strategic sorting/switching, and MC's complicit behavior in strategic salary manipulation.

Across the three interviews, staffers corroborated the notion of very flexible wage setting for congressional staffers. The current select committee on the Modernization of Congress recently introduced a *voluntary* pay band structure, but wage setting remains highly idiosyncratic and decentralized. While lower-tier staff have almost no leverage on their salaries, senior staffers have substantially more influence on their wages. This is also because senior personnel, like staff directors, are themselves responsible for wage setting in their offices. The interviewed staffers also stressed that the challenging working conditions, limited opportunities for career advancements in Congress, and high living expenses in Washington, DC drive many staffers towards outside options, most prominently the lobbying industry. Additionally, they made clear that most staffers are aware of HLOGA's restrictions from annual ethics trainings, congressional workplace rights trainings, the staff handbook, as well as informal conversations. With respect to staffers' ability to strategically circumvent HLOGA through sorting, staffer 3 mentioned an anecdote of a colleague who turned down a wage raise in order to avoid "this extra lobbying ban." Staffer 1 mentioned that mid-level staffers moving towards senior positions use their ability to turn down raises to sort below another "senior staff" threshold that determines staffers' financial disclosure responsibilities. All staffers confirmed that strategic sorting exists but is limited to very senior staff whose salaries fall within or close to HLOGA's coverage. Finally, concerning *employers'* support for strategic wage setting, staffer 1 highlighted that complicity by MCs is likely unnecessary since senior staff are themselves responsible for wage setting. Staffers 2 and 3, in turn, corroborated the notion that MCs and committee offices benefit substantially from connections to the lobbying industry, thus incentivizing them to support staffers' career strategies.

C Data Description

This paper uses two primary sources of data: 1) LegiStorm's congressional staff salaries data and 2) OpenSecret's lobbying disclosure data.

The original congressional salary records are detailed in the quarterly House and biannual Senate disbursement books and represent salary payments made during the particular time period in which a staffer was listed on the congressional payroll. These payments can include bonuses in addition to base salary payments; reimbursed expenses and benefits are excluded. LegiStorm –a non-partisan, for-profit organization that researches and publishes information about Members of Congress and congressional staff (http://www.legistorm.com) – has collected and cleaned the compensation records of all congressional staffers since 1998.

In order to resolve the numerous discrepancies and inconsistencies in the raw data, LegiStorm individually verifies all congressional staffers' names (including the various variants used across records), checks the employment information on staffers' offices and harmonizes title information. Due to the extensive manual checking done by LegiStorm, this data source is the most accurate, timely and comprehensive database for contact and biographical data on congressional staff used in the literature to date (Bertrand et al., 2014; Cain and Drutman, 2014; McCrain, 2018; Shepherd and You, 2020; Ritchie and You, 2021). As illustrated in the main text, the LegiStorm data includes salary disbursement data, information on staffers' names, their titles, and the offices for which they worked, as well as some background information, such as education and awards won. From the overall 1,282,854 records of staff employees across the US House and Senate in the full data, I retain 59,471 full-time staff who worked in Congress between 2001 and 2016.

To identify staffer-turned-lobbyists, I merge this set of congressional staffers to the list of registered lobbyists included in quarterly lobbying disclosure reports since 1998 (obtained from OpenSecrets). I first build on (Shepherd and You, 2020) who identified 4,696 individual lobbyists with prior work experience in Congress. Since these authors only focus on personal staffers and consider the revolving door only up until 2016, I expand their list of staffers-turned-lobbyists in the following way. First, I identify lobbyists whose records include keywords related to congressional positions when disclosing their previous employment. In particular, I search for

> *SENAT*, *SEN.*, *SEN *, *REP *, *REP.*, *TRADE REP.*, *REPRESENTATIVE*, *TRADE REPRESENTATIVE*, *REPRESENTATIVE OF*, *LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE*, *AA*, *AIDE*, *CHAIR*, *LEG FELLOW OFFICE*, *STAFF*, *LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR*, *LEG ASST*, *LEGISLATIVE ASST*, *COMMITTEE*, *COMM.*, *CMTE*, *HASC*, *HOUSE*, *WHITE HOUSE*, *CONGRESS *, *CONGRESSMAN*, *CONGRESSWOMAN*, *MEMBER OF CONGRESS*, *MBR OF CONG*, *WHIP*, *DEMOCRATIC*, *REPUBLICAN*, *SPEAKER*

Next, I merge this set of lobbyists to the full list of congressional staffers using a fuzzy name merge (Stata's `matchit` command). For each lobbyist, I retain the record in LegiStorm that returns the maximum similarity scores between names in OpenSecrets and LegiStorm (based on the bigram method in `matchit`). I then manually check each of these merges and verify that the match is correct based on the exact past employment information about lobbyists and their positions in Congress included in the LegiStorm data. I only retain matches where the office or MC listed in the lobbyist's past employment information is also included in the congressional records and the names overlap substantially (apart from some differences in spelling). For female lobbyists with past congressional employment information who could not be matched in this way (allegedly due to name changes through marriage), I further check staffers with identical first names, search for individuals online, and verify whether their employment records overlap with these staffers with the same first name but different last name. This procedure yields a total of 5,040 unique lobbyists who also appeared in the congressional records between 2001 and 2016.

To determine a staffer's HLOGA coverage status, I largely follow (Cain and Drutman, 2014) and classify a staffer as covered by the revolving-door regulation if her daily pay rate is

at least 75% of a member's daily pay rate throughout a calendar year. While this disregards HLOGA's condition that a staffer needs to earn above this salary threshold for at least 60 days in a year, it provides a conservative measure of a staffer's decision to switch out of coverage and allows me to build a consistent staffer-year panel. To evaluate the robustness of this coding decision, I also provide evidence in Table E10, Table E11 and Figure F9 using two alternative treatment codings that account for the days of coverage: 1) A staffer is covered if she earned at least 75% of a member's daily salary during any employment period for at least 60 days in a calendar year and 2) a staffer is covered if she earned at least 75% of a member's annual salary or if she was covered in December of the previous calendar year. The later accounts for the fact that staffers may be moved above the threshold by end-of-year bonus payments. Additionally, I verified my coding using the names of covered staff disclosed by the US House Office of the Clerk and the Secretary of the US Senate.[3] I used a similar iterative fuzzy name matching procedure to match the congressional records to this list of staffer names. For the years 2008-2016, this yields 2,767 unique staffers that appear in both the LegiStorm records and the congressional post-employment notifications data. Reassuringly, in 79% of cases my coding of the coverage in a staffer's final year in Congress coincides with the list of covered staff disclosed by Congress.

D Comparison to Cain and Drutman (2014)

Cain and Drutman (2014) examine the effectiveness of the post-employment rules of HLOGA in slowing the revolving door between Congress and the lobbying industry. Similar to this article, the authors exploit the one-year ban on contacts of ex-staffers with their former colleagues in Congress to estimate the effect of HLOGA on lobbying registration rates of Congressional staffers. Cain and Drutman (2014) use a difference-in-differences (DiD) design and LegiStorm data between 2001 and 2011 to compare lobbying registration among "covered" staff earning 75% or more of a member's salary (the treatment group) to registration among "high-level" staff making between 60% and 75% of a member's annual pay (the control group). The authors find that the tendency to register as a lobbyist within a year of leaving Congress declines more for covered staff than uncovered staff relative to the pre-HLOGA period. This decline is strongest for committee staff, Senate staff and majority party staff. Additionally, the authors show some substitution effects in the lobbying market, i.e. post HLOGA demand for high-level uncovered Senate committee staffers increased.

Cain and Drutman (2014) make important contributions to the literature on the revolving door and the effectiveness of respective regulations. In particular, the authors shed light on whether one of the most ambitious revolving-door regulations to date achieves its intended effects of slowing the flow of public officials into the lobbying industry. Additionally, Cain and Drutman (2014) add to existing evidence that connections and personal contacts tend to be of higher value in the lobbying market than policy expertise.

The DiD design and results in Cain and Drutman (2014) rest on two important assumptions. First, as the authors acknowledge, they treat the treatment and control groups as exogenous. If HLOGA creates perverse incentives for staffers to manipulate their salary to

[3] https://disclosures-clerk.house.gov/PublicDisclosure/PostEmploymentNotification; https://www.senate.gov/legislative/termination_disclosure/report2018.htm

move from covered to uncovered status, the implied effectiveness of HLOGA in reducing lobbying registration among covered staff may be an artifact of movements between treatment and control groups rather than an actual reduction in the revolving door. Second, the DiD design treats the pre-HLOGA years as control period. However, as noted in Appendix A of this article, the revolving door restriction was already on the books since the Ethics Reform Act in 1991. Thus, the DiD analysis provides evidence on the effect of *strenghtening* revolving-door regulations rather than imposing new rules.

This article builds on and moves beyond Cain and Drutman (2014) in various ways. First, my research differs in its contribution and approach. While Cain and Drutman (2014) evaluate the overall effectiveness of HLOGA, I uncover strategic reactions in the behavior of the regulated group. That is, instead of using the coverage of HLOGA at face value, I focus on *changes* in coverage by HLOGA, measured by staffers' sorting around and movement below the salary threshold. My aim is to capture the value of staffers' signal to the lobbying market (i.e. avoiding coverage) beyond the value of their political connections.

Second, I employ different methodology. While I rely on pre-HLOGA years for placebo analyses, I do not incorporate them in a DiD design for several reasons. First, my primary interest lies in the *marginal* effect of strategic behavior (switching out of coverage) on the probability of moving into lobbying post-HLOGA rather than the *difference* in the effect of switching across periods. Since the cooling-off period technically existed before HLOGA, staffers' potential strategic wage setting before HLOGA – albeit to a lesser degree – could weaken estimated differences in effect sizes and thus distract from the significant relationship of switching and lobbying success after HLOGA. Second, the validity of a DiD design heavily relies on the parallel trends assumption. However, unlike the usual DiD setting with fixed group assignments, my treatment is time-variant, and since my outcome is exiting Congress for lobbying, staffers who switch in year t necessarily have values of zero in the outcome variable for years $t-1, t-2, ...$ to be observed in my sample. Pre-trends in the probability of exiting between staffers switching in year t and those not switching in year t are thus mechanically parallel and equal to zero. Finally, given the limited number of sorting and switching staff together with the high turnover rate of staffers, a DiD setting poses several challenges for inference. A *within-staffer* DiD setup estimates the difference in the effect of switching on staffers' propensity to exit for lobbying across periods *for a given staffer*, i.e. only staffers with variation in the DiD terms contribute to the DiD estimate. Hence, staffer fixed effects reduce the effective sample size to only a few staffers who switched out of coverage *both* before and after HLOGA. Similarly, the limited number of switchers before HLOGA (430 compared to 796 after HLOGA) cause substantial power issues in a DiD setting. Hence, instead of DiD analyses, I rely on McCrary (2008) density estimates, fixed effects models and a within-staffer design, which allows me to account for any staffer-specific determinants of their revolving door.

Third, the implications we draw from this article are substantially different. Cain and Drutman (2014) provide key insights in the overall effectiveness of revolving-door regulations, such as HLOGA. This article, in contrast, uncovers an important dilemma of self-regulation in government by highlighting how accountability reforms like HLOGA can elicit regulatory evasion of regulated officials. Importantly, as discretionary cutoffs and loopholes are present in many regulations of money in politics, this finding may have broader implications for the success of ethics rules and reforms.

E Tables

Table E1: Summary Statistics by Year

Year	No. Staff	Av. Annual Compensation ($)	Mean Change in Annual Pay Rate (%)	Switches to uncovered status (%)	Turnover (%)	Lobbying (%)
2001	18,291	63,220	-	-	9.0	0.3
2002	19,547	63,219	15.7	0.4	17.5	0.6
2003	20,117	60,805	25.8	0.4	21.4	1.0
2004	18,506	65,149	12.0	0.3	14.1	1.0
2005	19,981	61,455	20.3	0.4	18.4	1.2
2006	19,049	64,754	12.7	0.6	15.2	1.2
2007	20,398	61,139	32.3	0.7	20.4	1.9
2008	18,833	66,765	11.8	0.7	13.3	1.2
2009	20,237	65,218	29.0	0.6	16.2	1.1
2010	19,274	70,012	10.2	0.4	13.6	1.0
2011	20,642	60,754	61.2	0.8	20.9	1.5
2012	18,297	66,290	9.9	0.5	13.7	0.9
2013	19,021	60,227	18.1	0.8	20.3	1.4
2014	17,477	64,494	13.3	0.3	13.9	1.1
2015	18,538	61,610	24.8	0.5	17.6	1.1
2016	16,358	62,111	10.7	0.4	-	2.0

Note: The table shows statistics for all full-time staff on the congressional payroll for 2001-2016. Observations on the staffer-year level. Average Annual Compensation is mean annual salary in 2015-dollar terms. Mean Change in the Annual Pay Rate is the average of the absolute year-to-year percentage change in inflation-adjusted annual pay by staffer. Switches to uncovered status is the share of staffers who moved from being covered in the previous year to being uncovered by HLOGA in a given year. Turnover is the rate of staffers in each year who do not appear on the payroll in the next year. Lobbying gives the share of departing staff who became registered lobbyists within one year.

Table E2: Regression Models for Switching Across Threshold

	Switch to covered from 65-75% pay		Switch to uncovered from 75-90% pay	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
After HLOGA	-0.032***	-0.028**	0.013**	0.014**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Controls		✓		✓
Mean of DV	0.320	0.320	0.082	0.082
Observations	9,751	9,751	10,846	10,846
R^2	0.001	0.008	0.001	0.027

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions of switching. Controls include days worked per calendar year and indicators for committee staff, personal staff, DC office staff and leadership office staff. Dependent variable: Dummy for switch across the threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E3: Regression Models for Becoming Lobbyist - Main Specification

	2008-2016			2007-2016		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switch to Uncovered	0.030***	0.019*	0.022*	0.032***	0.021**	0.022*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Days Worked		-0.000***	-0.000***		-0.000***	-0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Committee Staff		-0.005	-0.005		-0.008**	-0.007**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Personal Staff		-0.011*	-0.014**		-0.013***	-0.016***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Senate Staff		-0.000	-0.001		0.000	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Majority Party Staff		-0.003	-0.002		-0.003	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Minority Party Staff		-0.011***	-0.009**		-0.011***	-0.008**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
DC Office Staff		0.007***	0.008***		0.007***	0.008***
		(0.001)	(0.002)		(0.001)	(0.002)
Leadership Office Staff		0.000	0.000		-0.002	-0.003
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Hill Experience			0.003***			0.003***
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Hill Experience sq.			0.000			-0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Staffer FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of DV	0.014	0.014	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Observations	143,745	143,745	128,067	159,890	159,890	140,194
Number of staffers	37,744	37,744	34,438	41,264	41,264	36,921
R^2	0.014	0.056	0.059	0.012	0.058	0.061

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions with staffer and year fixed effects (not reported); all models include a constant. Dependent variable: Lobbying$_{it}$. Standard errors clustered by staffer in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E4: Regression Models: Switching Below Threshold and Demotions in Rank

	(1)	(2)
Switch to Uncovered	0.064***	0.062***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Staffer FE	✓	✓
Year FE		✓
Mean of DV	0.022	0.022
Observations	84,303	84,303
Number of staffers	27,162	27,162
R^2	0.002	0.006

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions of demotions in title ranks for staffers switching to below the cutoff post-HLOGA. Rank information obtained from Ritchie and You (2021). Dependent variable: Dummy for demotion in rank. Standard errors clustered by staffer in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E5: Intraclass Correlation Coefficients for Staffer Random Intercepts on Annual Salary

Rank	Title Group	ICC
Rank 1	Chief of Staff	0.224*** (0.018)
Rank 2	Deputy Chief of Staff	0.382*** (0.024)
Rank 3	State/District Director	0.485*** (0.014)
Rank 4	Legislative Director	0.509*** (0.017)
Rank 5	Communications Director	0.460*** (0.012)
Rank 6	Legislative Assistant	0.605*** (0.006)
Rank 7	Legislative Correspondent/ Deputy Press Secretary/ Specials Director/ Deputy State/District Director	0.530*** (0.008)
Rank 8	Executive Assistant/ Office Manager/ Caseworker/ Staff Assistant	0.703*** (0.003)

Note: Intraclass correlation coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) for staffer random intercepts, obtained from multi-level mixed effects models by staffer ranks. Rank information obtained from Ritchie and You (2021). Dependent variable: Inflation adjusted annual pay. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E6: Regression Models for Lobbying Revenue

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Switcher	0.936**	0.922**	0.774*
	(0.312)	(0.306)	(0.310)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 1	0.634***	0.672***	0.765***
	(0.135)	(0.144)	(0.139)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 2	1.066***	1.090***	1.133***
	(0.160)	(0.195)	(0.197)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 3	1.220***	1.247***	1.311***
	(0.161)	(0.195)	(0.195)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 4	1.300***	1.312***	1.400***
	(0.177)	(0.213)	(0.204)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 5	1.219***	1.201***	1.299***
	(0.199)	(0.249)	(0.242)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 6	1.139***	1.126***	1.269***
	(0.238)	(0.305)	(0.299)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 7	1.309***	1.241***	1.308***
	(0.204)	(0.302)	(0.296)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 8	1.226***	1.146**	1.143**
	(0.257)	(0.356)	(0.395)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 9	0.917*	0.866	0.683
	(0.448)	(0.544)	(0.645)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 10	0.825	0.752	0.635
	(0.562)	(0.692)	(0.800)
Year Since Leaving Congress = 11	1.939***	1.778***	1.697***
	(0.253)	(0.338)	(0.365)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 1	-0.251	-0.233	-0.124
	(0.316)	(0.321)	(0.309)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 2	-0.614	-0.626	-0.635
	(0.413)	(0.411)	(0.452)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 3	-0.757*	-0.740*	-0.743*
	(0.325)	(0.332)	(0.377)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 4	-0.640	-0.618	-0.639
	(0.358)	(0.359)	(0.417)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 5	-0.706	-0.657	-0.672
	(0.454)	(0.455)	(0.581)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 6	-0.516	-0.505	-0.767
	(0.513)	(0.514)	(0.658)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 7	-0.870	-0.921	-1.506
	(0.588)	(0.601)	(0.847)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 8	-0.330	-0.200	-0.813
	(0.537)	(0.537)	(0.623)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 9	-0.206	-0.244	-1.044
	(0.708)	(0.728)	(0.732)
Switcher x Year Since Leaving Congress = 10	0.778	0.703	
	(0.625)	(0.632)	
Year FE		✓	✓
Mean of DV	13.570	13.570	13.610
Observations	2200	2200	1950
R^2	0.042	0.047	0.106

Note: OLS regressions of log annual lobbying revenue on staffer characteristics and year fixed effects; Model (3) includes covariates described in Equation (2); all models include a constant. Dependent variable: $\log R_{jt}$. Standard errors clustered by lobbyist in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E7: Regression Models for Becoming Lobbyist - Switching staffers only

	2008-2016			2007-2016		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switch to Uncovered	0.029***	0.012	0.016	0.032***	0.014	0.016
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Days Worked		-0.000***	-0.000***		-0.000***	-0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Committee Staff		-0.006	-0.005		-0.007	-0.008
		(0.009)	(0.010)		(0.009)	(0.010)
Personal Staff		0.016	0.004		0.021	0.007
		(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.018)	(0.019)
Senate Staff		-0.013	-0.017		-0.004	-0.003
		(0.013)	(0.014)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Majority Party Staff		-0.013	-0.011		-0.010	-0.009
		(0.015)	(0.016)		(0.014)	(0.015)
Minority Party Staff		-0.011	-0.009		-0.012	-0.012
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.015)	(0.015)
DC Office Staff		-0.009	-0.003		-0.008	0.000
		(0.010)	(0.010)		(0.009)	(0.009)
Leadership Office Staff		-0.010	-0.001		-0.010	-0.005
		(0.015)	(0.014)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Hill Experience			0.007**			0.007**
			(0.003)			(0.002)
Hill Experience sq.			-0.000			-0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Staffer FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of DV	0.022	0.022	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.022
Observations	5,086	5,086	4,440	,5815	5,815	5,014
Number of staffers	928	928	790	1,011	1,011	835
R^2	0.026	0.089	0.095	0.024	0.088	0.092

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions with staffer and year fixed effects (not reported); all models include a constant. Dependent variable: Lobbying$_{it}$. Standard errors clustered by staffer in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E8: Regression Models for Becoming Lobbyist - Event History Analysis

	2008-2016	2007-2016
	(1)	(2)
Switch to Uncovered	0.022*	0.021*
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Days Worked	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Committee Staff	-0.005	-0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Personal Staff	-0.013**	-0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Senate Staff	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Majority Party Staff	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Minority Party Staff	-0.008**	-0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.003)
DC Office Staff	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Leadership Office Staff	0.000	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Staffer FE	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓
Duration FE	✓	✓
Mean of DV	0.015	0.015
Observations	128067	140194
Number of staffers	34438	36921
R^2	0.060	0.063

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions with staffer and year fixed effects (not reported); all models include a constant. Dependent variable: Lobbying$_{it}$. Standard errors clustered by staffer in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E9: Placebo Regressions for Becoming Lobbyist

	2001-2006		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Switch to Uncovered	0.015	0.010	0.039
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.021)
Days Worked		-0.000***	-0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Committee Staff		-0.004	-0.000
		(0.004)	(0.005)
Personal Staff		-0.014*	-0.005
		(0.006)	(0.008)
Senate Staff		0.001	0.003
		(0.005)	(0.006)
Majority Party Staff		0.003	0.001
		(0.005)	(0.007)
Minority Party Staff		0.003	0.002
		(0.005)	(0.007)
DC Office Staff		-0.007***	-0.007***
		(0.001)	(0.002)
Leadership Office Staff		-0.005	-0.010
		(0.006)	(0.008)
Hill Experience			0.005***
			(0.001)
Hill Experience sq.			0.000***
			(0.000)
Staffer FE	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Mean of DV	0.012	0.012	0.014
Observations	80,797	80,797	41,776
Number of staffers	29,056	29,056	16,278
R^2	0.015	0.067	0.111

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions with staffer and year fixed effects (not reported); all models include a constant. Dependent variable: Lobbying$_{it}$. Standard errors clustered by staffer in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E10: Regression Models for Becoming Lobbyist - Alternative Treatment Coding: Incorporate Days Covered

	2008-2016			2007-2016		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switch to Uncovered	0.064***	0.036***	0.040***	0.066***	0.037***	0.039***
(inc. days)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Days Worked		-0.000***	-0.000***		-0.000***	-0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Committee Staff		-0.006*	-0.006*		-0.008**	-0.008**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Personal Staff		-0.011*	-0.014**		-0.013***	-0.016***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Senate Staff		-0.000	-0.001		0.001	-0.000
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Majority Party Staff		-0.003	-0.002		-0.003	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Minority Party Staff		-0.011***	-0.009**		-0.011***	-0.008**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
DC Office Staff		0.007***	0.008***		0.007***	0.008***
		(0.001)	(0.002)		(0.001)	(0.002)
Leadership Office Staff		-0.000	-0.001		-0.002	-0.003
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Hill Experience			0.003***			0.003***
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Hill Experience sq.			0.000			-0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Staffer FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of DV	0.014	0.014	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Observations	143,745	143,745	128,067	159,890	159,890	140,194
Number of staffers	37,744	37,744	34,438	41,264	41,264	36,921
R^2	0.018	0.057	0.060	0.017	0.059	0.063

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions with staffer and year fixed effects (not reported); all models include a constant. Dependent variable: Lobbying$_{it}$. Standard errors clustered by staffer in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E11: Regression Models for Becoming Lobbyist - Alternative Treatment Coding: Incorporate December Previous Year

	2008-2016			2007-2016		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switch to Uncovered (adj)	0.012*	0.008	0.012	0.011*	0.007	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Days Worked		-0.000***	-0.000***		-0.000***	-0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Committee Staff		-0.005	-0.005		-0.008**	-0.007**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Personal Staff		-0.011*	-0.014**		-0.013***	-0.016***
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Senate Staff		-0.000	-0.001		0.000	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Majority Party Staff		-0.003	-0.002		-0.003	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Minority Party Staff		-0.011***	-0.008**		-0.011***	-0.008**
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
DC Office Staff		0.007***	0.008***		0.007***	0.008***
		(0.001)	(0.002)		(0.001)	(0.002)
Leadership Office Staff		0.000	0.000		-0.002	-0.003
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Hill Experience			0.003***			0.003***
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Hill Experience sq.			0.000			-0.000
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Staffer FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of DV	0.014	0.014	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Observations	143,745	143,745	128,067	159,890	159,890	140,194
Number of staffers	37,744	37,744	34,438	41,264	41,264	36,921
R^2	0.013	0.055	0.059	0.012	0.058	0.061

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions with staffer and year fixed effects (not reported); all models include a constant. Dependent variable: Lobbying$_{it}$. Standard errors clustered by staffer in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table E12: Regression Models for Becoming Lobbyist - DiD Specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Switch to Uncovered × Post-HLOGA	0.011	0.028†	0.028†	0.017	-0.014
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.019)
Switch to Uncovered	0.038**	0.012	0.013	0.009	0.038*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Post-HLOGA	0.003***	0.066***	0.065***	0.025***	-0.018
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.022)
Committee Staff			-0.012***	-0.004†	-0.003
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Personal Staff			-0.021***	-0.016***	-0.020***
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Senate Staff			0.000	0.001	-0.000
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Majority Party Staff			-0.007**	-0.001	0.001
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Minority Party Staff			-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.006*
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
DC Office Staff			0.005***	0.006***	0.009***
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Leadership Office Staff			-0.005	0.001	-0.000
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Days Worked				-0.000***	-0.000***
				(0.000)	(0.000)
Hill Experience					0.006***
					(0.002)
Hill Experience sq.					-0.000***
					(0.000)
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓
Staffer FE		✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of DV	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.015
Observations	240,687	240,687	240,687	240,687	181,970
Number of staffers		55,604	55,604	55,604	42,707
R^2	0.001	0.013	0.014	0.064	0.074

Note: Linear probability OLS regressions with staffer and year fixed effects (not reported); all models include a constant. Dependent variable: Lobbying$_{it}$. Standard errors clustered by staffer in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.01

F Figures

Figure F1: McCrary Density Estimates by Staffer Covariates, Before and After HLOGA



Note: Depicted are McCrary estimates together with 95% confidence intervals for different staffer types, before HLOGA (2001-2007) and after HLOGA (2008-2016). "Master" indicates whether a staffer has received a master's degree or higher (information missing for 59% of the sample). "Senior" indicates whether a staffer is above the 75th percentile of years of experience (8 years after HLOGA, 4 years prior to HLOGA; information missing for 24% of the sample).

Figure F2: Share of Staffers Leaving to Become Lobbyists, By Coverage Type



Note: Depicted are average shares of staff leaving to become lobbyists in a year by coverage status pre-reform (2001-2007) and post-reform (2008-2016), together with 95% confidence intervals. White figures indicate the number of staffers in each group.

Figure F3: Average Marginal Effects of Being a Switcher on Unweigthed Lobbying Revenue, By Year After Leaving Congress



Note: Depicted are average marginal effects of switching below the 75% cutoff in the last year in Congress before becoming a registered lobbyist. The baseline is covered staffers earning salaries above the 75% threshold in their last year in Congress. The estimation results are based on a version of Equation (2) with unweighted lobbying revenue as dependent variable. The sample includes Congressional staffers joining the lobbying industry after HLOGA. The level of observation is on the lobbyist-year, $N = 1,950$.

Figure F4: Average Marginal Effects of Being a Switcher on Number and Size of Lobbying Reports, By Year Since Leaving Congress



Note: Depicted are average marginal effects of switching below the 75% cutoff in the last year in Congress before becoming a registered lobbyist. The baseline is covered staffers earning salaries above the 75% threshold in their last year in Congress. The underlying models are identical to Equation (2), except for the dependent variables. The level of observation is on the lobbyist-year, $N = 1,950$.

Figure F5: Share of Member Salary That Switchers Move To



Note: Depicted are kernel density estimates for salary distributions (as a share of a member's salary) for switching staff after HLOGA took effect (2008-2016). The left panel shows salary distributions in the year after switching, the right panel shows salary distributions in the year of switching (5% of observations with shares above 1 not shown). Administrative staff excluded.

Figure F6: McCrary Density Estimates at Hypothetical Salary Cutoffs, After HLOGA



Note: Depicted are McCrary density estimates at hypothetical salary thresholds between 20% and 80% for years after HLOGA, together with 95% confidence intervals. The effect at the actual threshold of 75% is shown in red.

Figure F7: Robustness of the effect of switching on becoming a lobbyist



Figure F8: Placebo Analysis for the Effect of Switching on Lobbying Revenue



Note: Depicted are average marginal effects of switching below the 75% cutoff in the last year in Congress before becoming a registered lobbyist for staffers leaving Congress before HLOGA. The baseline is covered staffers earning salaries above the 75% threshold in their last year in Congress. The models include year fixed effects and staffer-level controls (see Equation (2)). Observations are on the lobbyist-year level, $N = 558$.

Figure F9: Average Marginal Effect of Being a Switcher on Lobbying Revenue: Alternative Treatment Coding



Note: Depicted are average marginal effects of switching below the 75% cutoff in the last year in Congress before becoming a registered lobbyist for staffers leaving Congress before HLOGA. The baseline is covered staffers earning salaries above the 75% threshold in their last year in Congress. The models include year fixed effects and staffer-level controls (see Equation (2)). Observations are on the lobbyist-year level.

Figure F10: Year-specific McCrary Density Estimates



Note: Depicted are year-specific McCrary estimates together with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure F11: Year-specific Estimates of Switching out of Coverage



Note: Depicted are year-specific estimates of the effect of switching out of coverage on lobbying employment, together with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure F12: Hiring in Industries Relevant for Post-Congress Employment



Note: Depicted are accession numbers in the lobbying industry (from lobbying registration records) and in the federal government (from OPM FedScope records).

Figure F13: Histogram of Staffer Salaries by Year



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